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Abstract
Humanitarians and bureaucrats who are mandated to work together in complex emergencies face many challenges, espe-
cially in settingsmarked by conflict and displacement. High on the list of challenges are barriers to sharing knowledge freely.
These barriers include (self)censorship, contested framings and priorities, deliberate ICT black-outs, and the withholding
(or not collecting) of mission-critical information. These barriers exacerbate the gaps in knowledge sharing that occur as
a result of a lack of time or capacity. This article conceptualises crisis knowledge as a ‘commons’: a shared resource that
is subject to social dilemmas. The enclosure of the knowledge commons—brought about by the barriers outlined above—
hampers daily operations as well as efforts to improve the situation in the long term. Trust is key to effective commons
governance, as actors need to sacrifice personal benefits (e.g., control over information) for a collective good (e.g., shared
learning). Knowledge and trust are deeply interlinked, as shared ways of knowing (alignment) foster trust, and trust fosters
the sharing of knowledge. Given the hierarchical nature of humanitarian relationships, this article explores how power and
networks shape this dynamic. It focuses on the humanitarian response to the 2018 Guji-Gedeo displacement crisis in the
south of Ethiopia. It presents a qualitative analysis of how the governance arrangements thatmarked this response shaped
emergency operations centres’ ability to manage the local knowledge commons effectively. It shows how in Guji-Gedeo,
these arrangements resulted in a clustering of trust that strengthened barriers to knowledge sharing, resulting in a partial
enclosure of the knowledge commons.
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humanitarians; knowledge commons; trust; wicked problem
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1. Wicked Problems: Problems of Alignment in
Knowledge and Trust
This article addresses one of themain challenges human-
itarians and bureaucrats face in their efforts to respond
to complex emergencies: barriers to the free and open
sharing of knowledge. This article is premised on the idea
that all stakeholders have knowledge that is relevant to
the crisis at hand, but that only a part of this knowl-
edge gets incorporated into humanitarian communica-
tions and information products. The article’s purpose is
to analyse how the relationships of power that under-
pin a humanitarian intervention influence the decisions
and actions of stakeholders to withhold, exclude, block,
or reframe knowledge prior to sharing. Its focus is on
the humanitarian governance arrangements that guide
collaboration between humanitarians and bureaucrats
in the field. It explores how international collaborative
mechanisms relate to state actors (see also Hendriks &
Boersma, 2019) given the intra-state power struggles
that mark conflict settings (Melis & Hilhorst, in press).
It aims to understand how these power relationships
shape what knowledge gets included, what gets exclud-
ed, and what gets reframed: In other words, how multi-
ple knowledges are filtered and translated into shared
information. This issue has direct practical relevance
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because barriers against the free and open sharing of
knowledge limit how effectively a complex emergency
can be addressed. Indeed, these barriers not only under-
mine day to day operations on the ground by depriv-
ing actors of mission-critical information but also ham-
per learning about the causes that triggered the complex
emergency in the first place. As such, this article will con-
clude with a practical recommendation as to how gover-
nance arrangements could be revised to foster a more
free and open sharing of knowledge.
To explore the issues outlined above, this article
presents a qualitative case study of the response to the
2018 Guji-Gedeo displacement crisis. This was a complex
emergency in the south of Ethiopia in which 800,000
people became internally displaced. Complex emergen-
cies are major humanitarian crises that are triggered
by multiple interlinked problems, such as political insta-
bility, violence, climate change, social inequality, and
poverty (Food andAgricultureOrganization of theUnited
Nations [FAO], n.d.). As a consequence, efforts to address
them cut across jurisdictions, organisational mandates,
authority structures, and group interests. This complexi-
ty, in terms of both root causes and institutional arrange-
ments, makes complex emergencies wicked governance
problems (e.g., Weber & Khademian, 2008). Wicked gov-
ernance challenges are characterised by a fragmented
knowledge base and a lack of consensus as to how
the underlying problems should be defined and, hence,
solved (Daviter, 2019). Complex emergencies involve a
wide range of actors, such as UN bodies, local bureau-
crats and NGOs. Given their different (professional and
geographic) backgrounds, these actors draw on different
bases of prior knowledge in their efforts to make sense
of humanitarian crises. In their endeavour to understand
themultiple interlinked problems, they work through dif-
ferent logics, use different lenses, and set different prior-
ities (Hilhorst, Desportes, & deMilliano, 2019). Themain
challenge this poses to the governance of wicked prob-
lems springs from the interconnection between knowl-
edge and trust (Henry & Dietz, 2011). Actors who know
in the same way, see in the same way, and are more
likely to trust each other’s intentions. By contrast, actors
who diverge in both what they know and how they see
things are likely to interpret the same event in differ-
ent ways, ascribing dishonest intent to the other’s fram-
ing (Henry & Dietz, 2011). The interconnection between
knowledge and trust is, to a significant extent, shaped
by perceptions of shared identity and interests. A fail-
ure to link up a fragmented knowledge base can trigger
a downwards spiral towards depleted trust. In a worst-
case scenario, ways of knowing become entrenched
in ‘us versus them’ thinking, resulting in a breakdown
in collaboration.
Following Hess and Ostrom (2007), this article
approaches knowledge as a ‘commons’: a resource
shared by a group of people that is subject to social
dilemmas (e.g., Henry & Dietz, 2011). A social dilemma
refers to a situation in which an actor benefits from act-
ing in their own (or their group’s) immediate self-interest
unless the majority of actors involved choose to do so,
in which case everybody loses. The main social dilem-
ma that marks a knowledge commons is the question of
whether to sacrifice the strategic (or financial) benefits of
control over information for the shared benefits of a con-
solidated knowledge base. In the context of a knowledge
commons, acting in one’s immediate self-interest gen-
erally entails withholding, blocking, or reframing knowl-
edge, i.e., enclosing a part of the commons. A large
body of research has emerged (e.g., Ostrom, Gardner,
& Walker, 1994) on the incentives that shape commons
members’ behaviour. Trust is a central theoretical vari-
able in this research: Actors are unlikely to sacrifice their
own immediate benefits for the good of the collective
if they do not believe that the latter will come through
for them. Most studies focus on small, simple commons,
where it is possible to explain actors’ choices based on
their direct interactions with others (e.g., Henry & Dietz,
2011). However, the knowledge commons that pertains
to complex emergencies is significantly more intricate.
It is comprised of a wide range of actors at field, nation-
al, and global level. Members of such a commons never
interact directly with the vast majority of other mem-
bers. They cannot assess key attributes (such as trust-
worthiness) of these members based on direct interac-
tion. For this reason, there is a growing recognition of
the value of conceptualising complex commons as social
networks (Henry &Dietz, 2011) This lens draws attention
to the ways in which relationships and affiliations influ-
ence what attributes (e.g., trustworthiness) commons
members subconsciously ascribe to each other. It also
highlights how these ties shape performative behaviour
to signal an actor’s position in a knowledge network to
others. As the case study shows, networked power rela-
tionships can incentivise (self)censorship towards cer-
tain framings and narratives. Desportes, Mandefro, and
Hilhorst (2019) highlight the resulting split between on
the record and off the record humanitarian communica-
tions in Ethiopia. As per these examples, a network lens
moves away from the rational actor model. It allows for
an analysis of behaviour that is shaped by relationships
and affiliations (such as subconscious associations and
performative behaviour) as opposed to pure rational con-
templation. This article follows this approach and under-
stands the term commons as a social network.
When it comes to governing wicked problems, such
as complex emergencies, commons scholars increasing-
ly look to localised and network-based approaches (e.g.,
Ostrom, 2010). These approaches are seen asmore effec-
tive than centralised, top-down ‘command and control’
approaches (e.g., Boersma, Ferguson, Groenewegen, &
Wolbers, 2014). One important reason for this is that
they allow for robust action in the face of wicked prob-
lems (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015). Robust action
entails not defining and solving ‘the problem’ fromabove
but instead fostering a plurality of local context-specific
problem definitions and solutions towards a richer over-
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all knowledge commons. Figure 1 depicts a robust action
approach to governing a knowledge commons in an ideal
scenario. At its core, this approach aims to interconnect
different knowledge clusters. The goal is not to impose
one framing at the expense of others or to bring about
one unified vision. Instead, the goal is to foster trust and
a broad sense of common purpose by interlinking ways
of knowing. This, in turn, facilitates local collaboration—
and hence resilience—in the face of complex emergen-
cies (Aldrich, 2012).
From a social network perspective, the rationale for
using a robust action approach to humanitarian knowl-
edge governance is as follows: ways of knowing a gov-
ernance issue can be conceptualised as fluid networks
comprised of human and non-human actants, such as
‘local bureaucrats’ and ‘humanitarian standards.’ As out-
lined above, ways of knowing are deeply interlinked
with a sense of shared identity and shared interests
(e.g., Feldman, Khademian, Ingram, & Schneider, 2006).
As such, by rearranging the connections between actants
(e.g., linking humanitarian standards to the knowledge
and interests of local bureaucrats), commons’ members
become more closely aligned (Feldman et al., 2006).
In this example, this would entail collectively linking
the standards to participants’ interests and professional
identities through situation- and context-specific discus-
sions, rather than imparting information about the stan-
dards in a top-down manner. This approach holds the
potential to foster goodwill, understanding, and trust,
which are key to collaboration (Aldrich, 2012). However,
interlinking ways of knowing requires a participatory set-
up and the safeguarding of different perspectives and
priorities (i.e., multivocality). If these preconditions are
not met, actors are likely to question the legitimacy of
the governance arrangements (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008)
and seek ways of ‘working around’ this set.
There are various tensions inherent in different forms
of commons (network) governance, and management
plays a core role in addressing these tensions (Provan
& Kenis, 2008). In humanitarian settings, fostering col-
laboration and trust between global/national actors and
subnational authorities, local service providers, and local
affected communities constitutes one of the main chal-
lenges. When it comes to complex commons such as
these, facilitative leadership is key to redressing pow-
er imbalances and fostering multivocal participation
towards greater trust and collaboration (e.g., Ansell &
Gash, 2008). This paper zooms in on the level of field
emergency operations centres (EOCs) and the response
coordinators’ efforts to bring people to consensus and
foster knowledge sharing on the ground. Its focus lies
hereby on the power dynamics that underpin the human-
itarian knowledge commons (networks). A central fea-
ture of the humanitarian sector is its deeply hierarchi-
cal nature (Barnett, 2011). Hence, the governance of
a humanitarian knowledge commons tends to be cen-
tralised and marked by power asymmetries. In the con-
text of a major response, it is normally brokered by
external network governance bodies (NGBs), generally
the national government and the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).
This article explores how the governance arrangements
that marked the humanitarian response in Guji-Gedeo
influenced the ability of response coordinators at the
EOC to act as facilitative leaders. Focusing on knowledge-
trust, this article addresses the research question: How
do governance arrangements shape incentives towards
enclosure of the knowledge commons?
Figure 1. Robust action–knowledge governance for wicked problems (ideal scenario). Source: Author.
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2. A Network-Power Lens
This article aims to understand how the relationships of
power that marked humanitarian governance arrange-
ments in Guji-Gedeo shaped the knowledge commons at
field level. It looks at how these power relationships influ-
enced trust between stakeholder groups, as well as how
it shaped their perceptions of the internal legitimacy of
the governance set-up. Its focus is on how connections,
affiliations, and network positions interlinked with differ-
ent forms of power to shape stakeholders’ incentives to
act in their immediate self-interest versus in the inter-
est of the collective response. This article takes a qualita-
tive social network approach. This approach is great for
exploring ‘how’ questions (Pratt, 2009), as it allows for
a detailed exploration of network processes and motiva-
tions, taking into account the social dimensions of ties
and networks and the relevance of context (Jack, 2008).
Different scholars have taken different approaches
to power in management (see, for example, Fleming
& Spicer, 2014, for an overview). Gaventa encompass-
es much of this scholarship in his ‘power cube’ (2005),
which is a three-dimensional tool for exploring how dif-
ferent levels, forms and spaces of power interlink in a
specific context. This article builds on this work by explor-
ing these interlinkages through a relational lens. Gaventa
distinguishes between visible power (e.g., the power to
coerce); hidden power (e.g., the power to manipulate);
and invisible power (e.g., the power to shape people’s
beliefs and behaviour, such as through tropes, formal
definitions, imagery, architecture, and so on). Gaventa
refers to visible, hidden, and invisible power as different
‘forms’ of power. This article looks at both domination
and the counter-power to subvert domination (Castells,
2007). These different forms of power play out at differ-
ent levels. In a humanitarian setting, the ‘global’ level is
the international community; the ‘national’ level refers
to actors working at the national level, generally from
the capital city; and the ‘local’ level refers to all activ-
ity that takes place at the sub-national level. Gaventa
also looks at different opportunities or ‘spaces’ for inter-
action. Given this article’s focus, it looks instead at dif-
ferent realms of knowledge governance. These realms
were identified during data analysis as second order
themes (see Figure 3 under Section 3). Briefly, the moral
realm governs what knowledge is right and important;
the hierarchical realm governs which ‘ranks’ knowledge
is included; the bureaucratic realm governs what knowl-
edge is authorised; and the physical realm covers what
knowledge can physically be shared andwhen (e.g., com-
munications black-outs). On the basis of this analysis,
Gaventa’s power cube has been adjusted (see Figure 2).
This adjusted power cube has been used for the analysis
presented in this article.
3. Methods
The case study and findings presented in this article are
based on three months of fieldwork in Ethiopia, car-
ried out between September and December of 2018.
During this period, the author was granted permis-
sion to attend coordination meetings at the Emergency
Operations Centre in Dilla town, Gedeo. In addition,
33 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key
stakeholders in Dilla town and at UN and NGO headquar-
ters in Addis Ababa. Participants were selected based
on their role, organisational affiliation, and location.
The qualitative power-network approach outlined above
informed the design of the interview protocol and the
data analysis. For the analysis, all 33 interviews were ful-
ly transcribed, along with four coordination meetings at
the EOC. These transcripts were analysed thematically
and compared and contrasted with each other, with field
notes, and with other primary sources (i.e., EOCminutes,
photographs, posters, briefings, reports) and secondary
sources (i.e., news articles, academic articles, and UN
reports). The analysis constituted a relatively open pro-













Figure 2. The power cube, adapted for a power analysis of knowledge governance. Source: Author, adapted from Gaventa
(2005).
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the theoretical framework and the data. In doing so,
the author was able to refine her theoretical observa-
tions and create theoretical categories (Gioia, Corley, &
Hamilton, 2013). The data structure has been outlined
in Figure 3: The 1st order concepts summarise state-
ments made by informants and/or found in other pri-
mary and secondary sources. They are organised by 2nd
order themes, which centre on theory. These 2nd order
Communications black-outs




Only authorized / official
information can be used
Only designated individuals can
speak ‘on the record’
Brokers select the ‘right’
information to share
Actor adhere to the ‘correct
framings and narratives
Gatekeepers restrict access
Only actors who conform to
dominant norms can participate
Autorizing operations /
communications (NGB: Fed. Gov.)
Facilitating access to funding
(NGB: UNOCHA)
Main provider of humanitarian
information (NGB: UNOCHA)
Main knowledge brokers between
field & HQ (both NGBs)
Appeal to national / global
standards (both NGBs)
Appeal to dominant norms and
conventions (both NGBs)
Granting / blocking field access
(Subnational bureaucrats)
Sharing / withholding information
(Subnational bureaucrats)
Subnational bureaucrats 
embedded in local networks
Surge humanitarians  embedded
in national/global networks
Global + national standards are core
to humanitarians’ prof. identity
NGBs = network governance bodies (here: the Federal Government and UNOCHA)
They are not core to subnational
bureaucrats’ prof. identity
Humanitarians turn not national/ 
global sources + contacts
Subnational bureaucrats turn to





















NGBs aligned with one
cluster only





Figure 3. Data structure. Source: Author.
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themes have, in turn, been combined into three aggre-
gate dimensions.
The analysis this article provides is based on the the-
orised interplay between these themes and dimensions
(this interplay is depicted in Figure 9 under Section 6).
4. Background to the 2018 Guji-Gedeo Displacement
Crisis
As with all complex emergencies, it is contested why the
Guji-Gedeo displacement crisis unfolded. This section
provides some history and context from the literature to
help the reader place the events. In line with this arti-
cle’s purpose, this is not intended as the definitive expla-
nation as to ‘what really caused the Guji-Gedeo displace-
ment crisis.’ The case study below focuses on events in
2018. That year, the country was still dealing with the
aftermath of a severe and prolonged drought, brought
on by El Nino. It hosted close to a million refugees from
neighbouring countries. Furthermore, in addition to the
Guji-Gedeo displacement crisis in the south, that year
Ethiopia also faced major internal displacement crises
in the east and the west of the country. As such, the
attention and resources of the federal government and
humanitarian community in Ethiopia were stretched.
The trigger that sparked the initial wave of dis-
placement in Guji-Gedeo in 2018 was an outbreak
of intercommunal violence. Ethiopia is home to mul-
tiple ethnic groups. After failed attempts at nation-
building through assimilation and centralisation, in the
early 1990s Ethiopia was restructured into an ethno-
federation (Kefale, 2013). This means that the country
was divided up into administrative regions along ethno-
linguistic lines. Ethnicity, rather than nationality, became
the vehicle for citizenship rights and entitlements. It also
became the medium through which conflicts (e.g., over
resources, over territory) came to be framed and under-
stood (Kefale, 2013). The Gedeos and Gujis used to be
neighbouring peoples living in the same province. They
managed conflict and cooperation through traditional
indigenous governance systems (Bekele, 2019; Debelo
& Jirata, 2018). However, in the early 1990s, an intra-
federal boundary was drawn between them. The Gujis
belong to the Oromo ethnic group and became part of
the Oromia region, whereas the Gedeos were includ-
ed in the SNNP region (Southern Nations, Nationalities
and Peoples; see Figure 4). Like everywhere else in the
country, this division was not tidy. Some argue that the
resulting tensions are the reason why violent conflict
broke out between the two groups (e.g., Debelo, 2012;
Kefale, 2013).
Under ethnic federalism, Ethiopia’s constitution
promised wide-ranging powers to Ethiopia’s regions.
However, in practice, the federal government dominated
Figure 4.Map of the zones of Ethiopia, highlighting West Guji and Gedeo zones. Source: Yarnell (2018).
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this relationship and frequently intervened in the day-to-
day activities of the regions (Kefale, 2013). The resulting
power struggle shaped the humanitarian response that
is the focus of this article.
5. Case Study: The Humanitarian Response to the 2018
Guji-Gedeo Displacement Crisis
5.1. The Main Challenge: Onboarding Subnational
Bureaucrats in a Federal-Global Response
In April 2018, a new prime minister came to pow-
er, Dr. Abiy Ahmed. He instituted a range of progres-
sive reforms, including the easing state political con-
trols. This may inadvertently have contributed to a
flare up of ethnic tensions. That month, after two
decades of relative peace, violent conflict broke out
again between the Gedeos and the Gujis. This result-
ed in the internal displacement of 300,000 people.
In response, subnational authorities launched an inves-
tigation and local traditional leaders undertook recon-
ciliation efforts. They quickly declared the crisis over
and encouraged the internally displaced people (IDPs)
to return home. Nevertheless, two months later, in June
2018, the conflict flared up again, resulting in the internal
displacement of 800,000 people. At this point, the feder-
al government and humanitarian community decided to
intervene. However, some subnational bureaucrats were
wary of external interference:
[T]he authorities even were not very keen on allow-
ing…they would make it very difficult for you to get
down to Dilla [town in Gedeo]. I mean, [they would
say] there’s no purpose of you going there. We are on
top of issues. Most of the IDPs have already returned.
So, what’s the point of you going there? So that was
the kind of attitude. (UN staff, November 3, 2018)
Experienced UN and federal coordinators negotiated
access and rolled out two EOCs, one inGedeo (Dilla town)
and one in West Guji (Bule Hora town). At this point,
humanitarian agencies came down to set up field offices.
The purpose of the EOCs was to connect and coordi-
nate between the local, national, and global bureaucratic
and humanitarian networks involved in the Guji-Gedeo
response. These platforms were initially successful in
bringing together different stakeholders for the purpose
of coordination. However, when the experienced UN and
federal coordinators were reallocated from Guji-Gedeo
to different assignments in early autumn, we see the sub-
national bureaucrats’ support for the EOC led response
subside. Theywere frequently invited to attendmeetings
but stayed away. “We tried. We begged many times,” a
federal government bureaucrat explained.
In September 2018, government authorities again
declared the crisis over. They stated that it was safe for
people to return and that it was important that they do
so. The coffee harvest was approaching, which was vital
to the local economy. Furthermore, the areas they had
fled to were already food insecure and too densely pop-
ulated. In addition, the buildings that were being used to
shelter IDPs were urgently needed for their original pur-
poses, such as schooling children and housing supplies.
As it was unclear which government agency was
responsible for organising returns, the subnational
authorities took it upon themselves to organise coach-
es to transport people back to their places of origin.
Some claim that they were following orders from the
federal government; others indicated that the decision
was made at the subnational level. The EOC got no
advanced warning:
They are very secretive. Even though they organized
the return, we were not aware. They organized by
themselves….I mean they mobilize buses and trucks
to send back the people to there, we have been
informing them that please inform us in advance so
that we can go there and see the process and support.
But so far, we don’t know. (UN staff, November 3,
2018)
Some IDPs claim that people were put under pressure
to return. Many who were bussed back were unable to
return to their home villages because they did not feel
safe and/or because their houses and farms had been
destroyed. As a result, some ended up living in displace-
ment sites nearby their original homes, whereas oth-
ers fled again. The consequence of pressuring people to
return to areas that were not yet safe was that many
soon fled their home villages again. They came to be
called ‘reverse returnees.’ Figure 5 provides a chronolog-
ical overview of the core events in 2018.
5.2. Humanitarian Network Governance: Connections,
Alignments and Trust
This section analyses how the network structures and
governance arrangements that marked the response
inhibited the effective onboarding of subnational bureau-
crats with the federal-global response. As already indi-
cated, the Ethiopian state is not a monolith but is made
up of a network of actors who do not necessarily see
things the same way. The government actors involved
in the Guji-Gedeo crisis were the federal government,
the zonal government of Oromia, the zonal government
of SNNP, and the district (woreda) governments of Guji
and Gedeo, as well as all the municipality (kebele) lev-
el government actors (see Figure 6). The field EOCs in
Guji and Gedeo were federal government initiatives led
by the National Disaster Risk Management Commission
(NDRMC). Although the federal government was power-
ful, the day-to-day lives of people were primarily shaped
by subnational authorities.
Subnational authorities, on occasion, sought to resist
federal control. “The challenge is that in this country
even though the head of NDRMC or the deputy prime
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Figure 5. Timeline 2018 Guji-Gedeo displacement crisis. Source: Author.
minister said yes or something, it does not mean that
zonal and woreda or regional authorities say yes. It’s not
automatic” (UN staff, November 3, 2018).
NDRMC’s background and strength lay in disaster
management in the context of natural hazards, not
conflict-induced crises. In line with this background,
the EOC’s mandate was limited to emergency response.
It did not include return and reconciliation or security.
As such, subnational bureaucrats had a valid reason not
to involve (or inform) the EOC of related activities:
It wasn’t our NDRNC colleagues who said the people
have to return. It wasn’t NDRMC colleagues blocking
access. This was zonal, woreda, regional. I mean there
is no smoking gun. We don’t know who was giving
what directives, but uh, it wasn’t that. (Donor staff,
December 13, 2018)
The United Nations supported the EOCs in Guji Gedeo
through the UNOCHA. The international dimensions of
the humanitarian response in Guji and Gedeo added
further layers of complexity. Most humanitarian agen-
cies were global entities, with offices at the subnation-
al, national, and global level. As is standard practice in
the sector, they coordinated with other organisations
working on the same issues (e.g., shelter, health, food,
protection) at all levels through standing bodies (clus-
ters) convened by lead agencies. The EOCs in Guji and
Gedeo coordinated between the clusters at field level.
Figure 7 depicts the humanitarian sector in simplified
form: Vertical networks of organisations that are horizon-
tally interlinked at different levels through the vertical
cluster system. The government of Ethiopia led the clus-













NDRMC (Federal Government) + UNOCHA (United Nations)
Emergency Operations
Centre West-Guji
Figure 6. The institutional context of the EOCs in Guji and Gedeo (simplified). Source: Author.
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Figure 7. The humanitarian cluster system (simplified). Source: Author.
As such, NDRMC and UNOCHA were the NGBs lead-
ing the EOC. With one notable exception, the NGBs suc-
ceeded at getting humanitarian partners to align their
efforts with the EOC. The main challenge they faced
was keeping the subnational bureaucrats on board and
engagedwith the EOC-led response. Given theNGBs’ lack
of formal leverage over subnational bureaucrats, and the
fact that return and security did not officially fall with-
in the EOCs’ remit, it was essential that the subnation-
al bureaucrats saw the EOCs as valuable spaces for shar-
ing their knowledge and furthering their interests. After
all, they could also work around these structures (which
they did).
However, it was much harder for the EOCs to estab-
lish legitimacy and trust with the subnational bureau-
crats thanwith the humanitarians. This is in part because
the NGBs responsible for managing the EOC were more
closely aligned with the national-global ways of know-
ing than with the local ones. Most of the humanitarians
stationed in Guji-Gedeo were only present in the area
part-time, shuttling between Awasa or Addis Ababa and
the affected region. All were on short-term assignments,
lasting 1–3 months, as is common in the sector. Expat
humanitarians tend to rotate quickly through assign-
ments in different disaster settings around the globe.
They often end up working with the same colleagues in
different settings. Many national humanitarians rotate
through short-term contracts with NGOs within their
country. In times of disaster (such as in Guji-Gedeo),
expats are flown in from abroad, and national staff are
rapidly transferred from wherever they were stationed
within their country to the affected area. This is called
a ‘surge.’ A surge is necessary in times of disaster for
the humanitarian community to get onto the ground
and scale up within a reasonable timeframe. However,
the result of this was that the vast majority of human-
itarians, including Ethiopians, did not have local net-
works in Guji-Gedeo. As such, they drew primarily on
national-global networks (such as the cluster system)
for humanitarian information, validation, and resources.
The NGBs leading the EOCs were centrally embedded in
these national-global networks. However, they were sig-
nificantly less well connected with the local networks in
which the subnational bureaucrats were embedded. This
idea is presented in Figure 8.
6. Findings: Network Governance Arrangements and
the Enclosure of the Knowledge Commons
The article now presents the findings of the network-
power analysis outlined in Section 2. As described above,
the networks that came together at the field EOCs were
broadly divided into two clusters: the national-global
cluster of the humanitarians and the local cluster of the
subnational bureaucrats. Naturally, there were intercon-
nections between these clusters, as well as great diver-
sity within them. Nevertheless, when zooming out, it
is the significant disconnect and misalignment between
these two clusters that stands out. Given that the NGBs
were centrally embedded in the national-global cluster,
but not the local cluster, they held significant leverage
over the humanitarians but not the subnational bureau-
crats, as described below. This contributed to (the perfor-
mance of) a broad consensus within the national-global
cluster and the marginalisation of the local cluster at
the EOC. As a consequence, the subnational bureaucrats
were not effectively onboarded in the federal-global
response and worked around it to achieve their goals.
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Figure 8. Embeddedness bureaucrats and humanitarians versus embeddedness EOCs in Guji-Gedeo. Source: Author.
This section describes the role power and knowledge gov-
ernance played in this process.
6.1. Power and Counter-Power: The Physical Enclosure
of the Knowledge Commons
The government’s leverage over humanitarians (includ-
ing UNOCHA) was ultimately underpinned by their vis-
ible power to block access to the field. Government
actors could physically stop these agencies from direct-
ly acquiring knowledge of local circumstances in per-
son. As described, in their efforts to counter global-
national control, some subnational bureaucrats initially
tried to block humanitarian access to Guji-Gedeo, phys-
ically enclosing the knowledge commons. The federal
government of Ethiopia, by contrast, could bar human-
itarian agencies from operating in Ethiopia altogether.
They could also block the virtual exchange of knowledge
between field locations in Ethiopia and the wider world.
The federal government owned the only telecommuni-
cations provider in Ethiopia and, as such, could physi-
cally disconnect humanitarians stationed in Guji-Gedeo
from the wider national and global networks on which
they depended.
In 2018, there were several deliberate communica-
tions black-outs ranging from several hours to several
weeks. These black-outs were triggered to quell tensions
and lower the risk of violence. Indeed, prior to his cur-
rent role as prime minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed founded the
Ethiopian Information Network Security Agency (INSA)
whose statedmission is to “secure cyber for peace, devel-
opment and democracy.”
Due to the current conflict situation, the internet was
disconnected in all over eastern parts of the country.
[Twoweeks later] still internet connection is not work-
ing. I am using the government one which is connect-
ed for emergency case. (INGO staff, emails, August 9
and 20, 2018)
6.2. Power and Counter-Power: The Bureaucratic
Enclosure of the Knowledge Commons
UNOCHA’s leverage over humanitarians and government
actors was underpinned by its visible power to grant or
deny access to connections and resources. This power
sprang from its (network) position as lead UN humanitar-
ian coordinator, donor liaison and emergency fund man-
ager. Whilst globally a very influential player, in the con-
text of the NDRMC led response, UNOCHA’s official role
was to support. The agency sought to strike a balance in
its efforts to liaise between government and humanitari-
an partners at the field EOCs. However, the requirement
to work through government structures made this chal-
lenging. “Some people regard OCHA like very close to the
government” (UN staff, November 3, 2018).
NDRMC, as a federal agency, held significant lever-
age over the humanitarians, including UNOCHA. In addi-
tion to blocking access and triggering blackouts, the fed-
eral government also held the visible power to enclose
the knowledge commons through bureaucratic means.
They could block the publication of humanitarian infor-
mation products or they could withhold their official
approval for them, which made them hard to use. This
strongly incentivised humanitarians to operate within
the boundaries of knowledge management that were
explicitly placed on them, for example, in the context of
protecting Ethiopia’s global image:
You know, in Ethiopia since 1984, there has not been a
famine. Now the thing about famine is that it’s a tech-
nical definition that you only know about it if you are
collecting mortality data. We aren’t allowed to collect
mortality data. (UN staff, October 3, 2018)
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In field operations, humanitarian actors were expected
to use only the data and information that had been
put together, or at least signed off on, by government
actors. They overwhelmingly complied with the bureau-
cratic restrictions that were placed on what knowledge
they could publicly share or use. This public performance
of compliance contributed to the global-national cluster
appearing as one powerful, aligned block.
Subnational bureaucrats had the ability to bypass
the EOC and work around this block. In addition to
attempts to physically enclose the knowledge commons,
described above, they also used bureaucratic means to
influence (or subvert) the federal-global response, for
example by withholding mission-critical information:
I think if the figures have not been endorsed by the
zone, how do we respond? How do we target?….I’m
sure there are various partners who work in those
areas. They are ready actually to intervene but we
need that official…we don’t have any official infor-
mation so we cannot tell the partners to help with
need. (IOM staff, coordinationmeeting at EOC in Dilla,
Gedeo, November 2, 2018)
Working around the EOC, some subnational bureaucrats
sought to influence the movement of reverse returnees
by not registering them. As such, they were absent from
the official beneficiary lists humanitarians had to use to
organise aid: “They know howmany people arrived…but
they are not officially registering people—those, as I said,
reverse returns….The reason they explain always is that
if they register that become kind of a pull factor for that
they stay here” (UN staff, November 3, 2018).
6.3. Against Participation: The Hierarchical Enclosure of
the Knowledge Commons
The power imbalances between the federal-global and
local clusters at the EOC also determined whose norms,
values and expectations influenced interactions at the
EOCs. In Guji-Gedeo, the routines and established ways
of working of the federal-global cluster dominated. As a
result, the participation of key local stakeholders was
(inadvertently) restricted.
The mandate of the EOC was formally limited to
emergency response and did not include return, reconcil-
iation, or security. Efforts in these areas were conducted
at local level by subnational bureaucrats and traditional
leaders. Given the challenge the issue of return posed
to the EOC-led response, knowledge sharing and coor-
dination with these actors would have greatly helped.
However, nobody expected the traditional leaders—or
representatives of the IDPs themselves—to attend EOC
meetings or read EOC communications. All written and
spoken communications at the EOC were in English,
which is the lingua franca in the humanitarian world
and often the default for knowledge sharing. By adopt-
ing this common practice, the EOCs inadvertently linked
people’s ability to participate meaningfully to their lev-
el of English. This also disadvantaged some subnation-
al bureaucrats who, unlike their Ethiopian counterparts
based at international NGOs and UN agencies, were not
used to working in this language. Inviting actors to share
their knowledge without actually enabling them to do so
on an equal footing does little to foster multivocality or
trust. It hierarchically limits access and participation in
the commons by the extent to which stakeholders con-
form to the norm in terms of knowledge and skills—in
this case, the national-global norm.
6.4. Against Multivocality: The Moral Enclosure of the
Knowledge Commons
The visible and invisible power aligned with the federal-
global cluster, described above, also fed into NDRMC
and UNOCHA’s hidden power to frame narratives. These
NGBs were able to call on shared (or imposed) under-
standings of what is right and what is important in their
efforts to ‘morally’ enclose the public knowledge com-
mons. As indicated above, many organisations actively
engaged in self-censorship and upheld strict communica-
tion policies to ensure that their ‘on the record’ knowl-
edge focused on what was ‘right’ and ‘important.’ ‘Off
the record knowledge’ was generally withheld from the
public commons: “We have to situate ourselves in a way
that, first of all, we are not contradicting the govern-
ment narrative because that can also get us into trouble”
(UN staff, December 14, 2018).
Due to their network position (see Figure 7) UNOCHA
and NDRMC held significant influence over decisions as
to what constituted ‘the right information.’ Their field
coordinators, who shuttled in between Addis Ababa and
the EOCs in Guji-Gedeo, were able to prioritise, select,
and frame information for audiences at different levels.
This was also the case for staff taking care of minutes,
field reports, website content, and so on:
Especially when you’re dealing with complex issues,
you’re dealing with issues that—we don’t have some
kind of straight jacket kind of decisions. There are
always various valid opinions from different people.
But then our role in that is, first of all, to provide the
narrative, the right narrative from the field. What is
happening in the field. We provide information that
will help people to reach to a consensus, you know.
(UN staff, December 14, 2018)
In the humanitarian sector, what is right and important
has been articulated in standards, principles, and guide-
lines (such as the UN principles of sustainable voluntary
return). The humanitarians interviewed for this study all
considered these institutions to be central to their mis-
sion and organisation’s identity. Furthermore, they also
held significant strategic value to these actors, lending
legitimacy to humanitarian organisations that (are seen
to) adhere to them. Many humanitarians strategically
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use the language and framings provided by these univer-
sal standards to communicatemore effectively with lead-
ing agencies and donors (e.g., UNOCHA) to get legitimacy
and funding. Given these strategic interests, the human-
itarian organisations in Guji-Gedeo were both moral-
ly and materially aligned with this broad set of values.
Humanitarian knowledge brokers in Guji-Gedeo could,
therefore, count on their assent when framing narratives
in accordance with these norms, values, and priorities.
In Guji-Gedeo, the issue of ‘forced return’ was
of central importance to the humanitarian response.
Knowledge brokers framed related information in terms
of the UN principles of voluntary return in safety and dig-
nity. In doing so, they drew both on their hidden pow-
er to frame narratives and the invisible power of shared
values to further a sense of common purpose within the
federal-global cluster. However, the subnational bureau-
crats were embedded in different knowledge networks.
They viewed the displacement crisis through the lens of
the host communities and the pressure the IDP crisis
placed on ‘their people’:
So, in that case in the guidelines I’m not sure whether
the zonal people are fully aware of each and every sin-
gle context. And I don’t know whether they feel that
they need to respect. Because again the federal peo-
ple does not have any leverage to regional and zonal
people. (UN staff, November 3, 2018)
Ideally, the EOCswould have facilitated a dialoguewhere-
by all stakeholders explored how local and national-
global principles (such as the UN principles of voluntary
return in safety and dignity) connected with their own
interests and professional identities in the specific con-
text of the response, and how this could be translated
into a broad common purpose. Instead, the subnation-
al bureaucrats were confronted with a top-down fram-
ing as to what was right or important, with little explo-
ration as to how this connected to their perspectives
and priorities.
6.5. The Downwards Spiral Towards the Enclosure of the
Knowledge Commons
The EOC-led response in Guji-Gedeo started with two
(largely) disconnected clusters that were each embed-
ded in different knowledge networks. Given the inter-
connection between knowledge and trust, this discon-
nect gave each cluster the impression that the other
was not just wrong (e.g., on the topic of return), but ill-
intentioned. This mistrust was not effectively redressed.
As a result, stakeholders did not act in a pro-commons
manner by facilitating the free and open sharing of
knowledge. Instead, over time, they actively or passively
contributed to its ever greater enclosure, deepening the
disconnect and misalignment between the two clusters
and furthering a downwards spiral towards a breakdown
of collaboration in Guji-Gedeo (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9. The downwards spiral towards a breakdown in collaboration at the EOCs in Guji-Gedeo. Notes: Cluster A refers
to the federal government and humanitarians; cluster B refers to sub-national bureaucrats. Source: Author.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 407–420 418
7. Conclusion and Discussion
This article has approached humanitarian knowledge
as a complex commons and a wicked problem: a net-
worked resource that connects a wide range of actors
and is subject to social dilemmas. It contributes to the
wicked commons literature by exploring these social
dilemmas through the lens of network power. Focusing
on knowledge-trust, it analyses how connections, affil-
iations, and network positions interlink with different
forms of power to shape stakeholders’ incentives to sac-
rifice direct benefits (e.g., control over information) for
a collective good (e.g., shared learning). The article con-
tends that disconnected and misaligned ways of know-
ing are among the core challenges that mark a wicked
commons. The article suggests a robust action approach
to knowledge governance as a solution in principle to
this challenge. Robust action allows for the interlinking
of different ways of knowing towards the development
of a (very) broad sense of common purpose, shared iden-
tity and trust. It facilitates decentralised trial and error
learning, as well as the (partial) integration of local con-
text specific knowledge with a national-global eviden-
tiary knowledge base. This has the potential to improve
both daily operations as well as understanding of the
core problems that mark the wicked commons. Robust
action does not require consensus and is fundamen-
tally incompatible with the moral, hierarchical, physi-
cal and bureaucratic enclosure of the knowledge com-
mons. Looking at governance arrangements, this article
has analysed how network power shaped the enclosure
of the knowledge commons, rendering a robust action
approach non-viable.
This article now concludes with a tentative response
to the question how do network governance arrange-
ments shape incentives towards enclosure of the knowl-
edge commons?
The EOC led response in Guji-Gedeo was marked by
hierarchical networks that were broadly divided into two
clusters: the national-global and the local. The NGBs in
charge of the response were centrally embedded in the
former and only loosely connected to the latter. As such,
they held significant leverage over the expat and nation-
al humanitarians and little over the subnational bureau-
crats. This meant that the EOCs did not (could not) oper-
ate as multivocal, participatory spaces (see Figure 9).
Power aligned with the national-global cluster fostered
the hierarchical enclosure of the knowledge commons,
which amplified the ways of knowing of that cluster and
silenced those of the local cluster. It also contributed
to the moral enclosure of the knowledge commons, fos-
tering (the performance of) a broad sense of consen-
sus within the global-national cluster, which alienated
the local cluster. As a result, there was a clustering of
trust and belief in the internal legitimacy of the gov-
ernance arrangements. Most humanitarians were effec-
tively onboarded in the federal-global response, but not
the subnational bureaucrats. Given that the latter were
able to work around the EOC, they instead exerted influ-
ence over the response through physical and bureau-
cratic control over the knowledge commons. Efforts on
both sides to enclose the knowledge commons fed into
a downwards spiral towards depleted trust and a break-
down in collaboration.
To create an environment that is conducive to a
robust action approach, local coordination/communica-
tion platform conveners (such as field EOCs) need to be
positioned so as to enable their coordinators to act as
facilitative leaders who can redress power imbalances,
foster participation and multivocality. This means that
they cannot be NGBs who are in a position of significant
influence over some network members, or have a strong
prior alignment with some network clusters, and not oth-
ers. It also means that they cannot be strongly affiliated
with such NGBs. Given the importance of local engage-
ment, local learning and local leadership in the face of
wicked problems, national-global support for local prob-
lems might be best governed through independent sub-
national NGBs whose leadership equally represents the
different global, national and local knowledge-clusters
that comprise the commons at the subnational level.
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